Thursday, September 01, 2005

Is abstinence immoral?

I know, you wouldn't think I would raise a question like that. And I wouldn't—in earnest, anyway. I made it my title to start focusing your attention on what's really interesting about those who would answer "yes."

During the heyday of the so-called "sexual revolution," in New York a generation ago, I did encounter that answer from a few people I knew. Having observed my sometimes successful efforts to be chaste, they assured me that ongoing success would endanger my mental health. If that were true, I suppose chastity would be immoral. But that viewpoint, there and then, was only to be expected. What I've never expected is to see it becoming conventional wisdom. Apparently it is.

Ted Olsen at Christianity Today's "Sexuality and Gender" forum has posted some interesting tidbits in support of the following trenchant observation:

Can we be good without God? The question seems somehow abstract, a topic for Atlantic Monthly cover stories and college seminars more than practical applications. So here's another question: Can we keep our pants on?

Ironically, the group that often answers "yes" to the first question says "no" to the second. And some believe that not only can't we stay chaste, but we should not.
(Emphasis added.) Olsen proffers many tidbits in support of those last two assertions. Typical is this: "An abstinence-until-marriage program is not only irresponsible," U.S. Rep. Barbara Lee, D-Calif., said last year. "It's really inhumane." My eyes are still bulging; she actually said it is inhumane to counsel and educate young people to avoid fornication. The only humane thing would be to give them condoms and winks.

Such abject surrender to hormones seems like conventional wisdom only because the MSM promote it tirelessly, though more through spin than through philosophical argument. Yet the philosophy is most instructive.

Olsen is right, and there's an obvious inference to be drawn. People who like to point out that one can be good without believing that there's a God who requires us to be good tend to have a different moral code than those who believe that morality has some foundation in God. That some atheists and agnostics are virtuous, to a degree, goes without saying; that secular and religious morality intersect at various points also goes without saying. So what's the difference that accounts for Olsen's ever-more-accurate point?

The difference is that secular morality, at bottom, is relativistic. Sure, there have been rather fastidiously moral people, including some philosophers, who were neither theists nor relativists. There still are. But once ethics are unmoored from God, then a moral philosophy that is absolutist in principle becomes relativistic in fact. For all such morality is, ultimately, a matter of opinion; and opinions in turn are affected more by culture and its evolution than by any philosophia perennis or religious authority. Thus, once contraception and abortion both became widely available, especially to the young, the sort of sexual morality once sustained by Judaism and Christianity, and retained by the Victorians regardless, became far weaker than the appeal of sex without apparent consequences. Only God, and a life sustained by a relationship with God, can definitively resist the power of that appeal in a person's life.

Okay, I admit that STDs convince some here and there to get back on the straight and narrow—the ones who don't seek cheap grace in the form of condoms. But that actually segues into my next point. The elements of traditonal morality that secular liberalism retains are those which don't require much inner self-denial, have some clear utilitarian value, and make us feel good about ourselves. That's why the morality of secular liberalism is actually harder on certain sins, such as neglect of the poor and the sexual abuse of minors, than traditional morality. Championing obvious victims and vilifying the victimizers makes us feel good about ourselves, reduces the amount of overt nastiness in society, and doesn't require much sacrifice of us as individuals beyond government action—i.e., laws and taxes. But the same people who execrate non-consensual sex also execrate the voluntary renunciation of consensual sex outside marriage. People can't be expected to deny themselves to that extent, can they? We're only human, after all; and aren't humans just animals with speech and creativity?

Which brings me to the ultimate irony in such morality. These people are always chanting "Choice, choice," as though we have some sort of freedom of the will that mere animals lack and as though such liberty were an inherent, not just a socially constructed, right. And we do have some such liberty: as creatures of God subject to God. But once freedom is unmoored from God along with morality it becomes, literally, autonomy. Humans, either individually or collectively, thus legislate for themselves without reference to a divinely bestowed natural law whose precepts are written in the collective conscience of the race. Once that happens—and the many Barbara Lees of the world take it as a fait accompli—then expectations descend to the least common denominator toward the bestial. That's what's happening in our society with sex. If it doesn't stop, we'll find that it happens with everything else too.

My argument is essentially the same as that of C.S. Lewis' The Abolition of Man. I always used to require it in my undergraduate ethics courses because, written in the World-War-II era, it was one of the most prophetic books of modern times. Read it if you haven't already.

8 comments:

  1. I wonder whether the autonomy of Kant, "unmoored" as it is from God, is really subject to the sort of criticism you're leveling at God-free morality? Certainly Kant didn't think so, but perhaps you are suggesting that, in the end, even his rational criterion is a social construct?

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  2. Scott:

    Kant is one of the absolutist moral philosophers I had in mind. His deontology makes a kind of philosophical sense; psychologically, it is both natural and sustainable in terms of his pietism. But of course there are many philosophical alternatives, equally high-and-dry; in face of such dissensus, Kant's sort of moral philosophy is, like the Stoics' once was, unable to motivate people collectively.

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  3. I think your point about motivation is a good one. Even if one accepts the logic of the categorical imperative (or what Hadley Arkes has called the logic of morality) there is still the problem of getting people to form a Good Will.

    I wonder how different the problem is for Christians, though? I often hear people talk about winning heaven as a motivation for right action, as though it were some sort of utilitarian calculus. I don't think that sort of talk entails consequentialism, but sometimes it does sound like it. How do we motivate people to act out of love of God rather than in a kind of enlightened self-interest?

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  4. Scott:

    The mass of people certainly do think of obeying the rules as fire insurance for eternity. In fact, that's a legitimate stage in everybody's moral development; we all pass through it. Kohlberg was right in that respect. Many never get beyond it, at least not consistently. I agree with you that getting beyond it is desirable; for those who actually can, it is necessary.

    Still, I believe it's a mistake to speak of love for God rather than enlightened self-interest. That's because love for God just is a kind of enlightened self-interest: if we are made for God, as St. Augustine taught so eloquently, then the best thing we can do for ourselves is love God. But of course there's a paradox at the heart of that: we can't secure our self-interest without putting God first and thus above our self-interest. Saints have taught that since Day One, and many have sought to emulate them.

    The paradox does not offend reason. It is the most special case of the paradox of happiness: one cannot attain happiness reliably if one makes "happiness" one's ultimate goal. Happiness as a subjective state is reliably attainable only as a byproduct of seeking what is objectively good, even and especially when that entails much self-denial. "He who would save his life will lose it; he who loses his life for my sake will have eternal life." See my post on that theme.

    I've been much helped by Tolkien here. I trust you remember the scene from The Return of the King when Samwise, amid the dark of Mordor and Shelob, looks up at the stars and says to himself (I don't have the exact quote handy) something to the effect: "It doesn't matter what happens to us in particular. Good will win in the end, and our highest destiny is to contribute to it." I've reached the point in life when that attitude, transposed into a Christian key, is what keeps me going. I trust I'm on the right track with that.

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  5. Mike,

    You've touched on a topic that I've been struggling with for a long time. Is love for God really a form of enlightened self interest? I agree with you that it can be, but I'm always reminded of the saying of St. Thomas More: If, on account of my sins, he permits me to perish, at least his justice will be praised in me. That's a pretty saintly attitude, obviously, but it strikes me as something rather different from enlightened self interest.

    My own view is that love of God entails something that is good for me and, hence, it is consistent with acts done out of enlightened self interest. But my motivation for doing what God commands cannot be self interest in any form, because we are to abandon our very selves to God's will (shameless self-promotion here: check out my own blog on this topic here). Like the concept of happiness in Kant's ethics, my own salvation is not something that motivates me to act but something that I get on the side, a kind of payoff, if you will, that comes unlooked for.

    I think that might be consistent, at any rate, with the quote from Sam! Anyway, I'll be interested to hear more about what you think.

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  6. Scott:

    I believe the difficulty here is that we're taking 'enlightened self-interest' in two different but related senses. The term was coined by Alexis de Tocqueville to describe what he found to be a distinctive American attitude facilitating the growth of civil society in the form of voluntary associations for mutual benefit. The thinking was that heaven helps those who help others as much as they help themselves. The premise of that is expressed nowadays as "What goes around comes around." I agree that enlightened self-interest in that sense is not quite that which I described in my previous post. But I also believe it to be indispensable to the cohesion of the human collective in both a secular sense (the state, civil society) and a religious sense (the Church, the ecclesia or "assembly" of the faithful). I would accordingly argue that enlightened self-interest in the DT sense (ESI-DT) is not negated but subsumed by enlightened self-interest of the more refined spiritual sort (ESI-RS).

    That is because, in order to be enlightened, ESI-DT cannot remain merely self-interest. If one's love for others or even for God is primarily motivated by what it can achieve for oneself, then it will not be genuine love of them. Love for others in the relevant sense is active concern for their welfare requiring that we seek their welfare to at least the same extent as we seek our own. Such love accordingly entails a willingness to sacrifice, i.e., to abandon direct self-seeking when the two genuinely conflict. The greater and more noble the sacrifice, the greater the love. But it's important not to take that truth so far as to render ESI-RS objectively incompatible with ESI-DT.

    If reality is as the Christian revelation says it is, then the two cannot ultimately conflict; the latter merely gives mature expression to the former. Correctly understood, St. Thomas More's remark is compatible with saying that. His remark was of the same sort as the expressed attitude of certain mystics, such as St. Teresa of Avila, who claimed she would willingly go to hell if that would serve God's loving purpose in saving humanity. In giving voice to the purity of the theological virtue of charity, such statements stress the subjective paradox of ESI-RS; but the paradox is not a contradiction because, in reality, God has not set things up so that some must go to hell in order for others to go to heaven. And such saints would be among the first to say so. God wants "all people to be saved and come to knowledge of the truth"; that process occurs in and through Christ's Mystical Body, the Church, the collectivity glued together by divine love. To be a member of that collectivity in the sense Christ intends is to exhibit ESI-RS. And if Catholicism is true, such membership subsumes and transforms ESI-DT—just as the sacrament of marriage, when lived, subsumes and transforms eros in agape.

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  7. Mike

    Thanks for the further comments--this has been extremely interesting. You've helped me to understand some things a little better!

    best
    Scott

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  8. You're welcome, Scott. I too find this very interesting. Would you join me in further exploration if I set forth our little "state of the question" as a post?

    Best,
    Mike

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